A surprising connection on the professional network. An offer of work from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to earn perhaps £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of political reports for a firm from China containing confidential or “insider” insights. Payment in digital currency or physical money favored.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that something about this method would be amiss. However, China’s influential intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to use headhunters to try it – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations on the internet.
Massive Approaches on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding 30-month period, attempting to obtain political, commercial, military and scientific secrets. However a new initiative targeting elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage warning was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, lords, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Updates
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the agency knew its advisory document would leak once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press helps the wider public better identify interactions with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the effect of uncovering more information from in and around parliament, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The service wants people in public life to recognize that just because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, although the recent actions occur after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for China – a charge they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Long-Term Goals
The law has now been changed, and the MI5 slide contains a reminder of its successor: “Individuals involved in spying operations risk significant criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” It is a crime if a person engages in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have restricted access of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s China policy on matters such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by parliamentarians.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Digital Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like China’s utilize information gathering techniques and the size of its spy network is enormous, engaging 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is willing to develop people over the extended period and at times even the agencies have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “China has a minimal requirement for what information is considered to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may result in someone rapidly peripheral becomes important.
An alternative perspective to consider the continuous efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the Western nations at a threshold below the level of direct conflict. China has increased its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the another operation compromise of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in relentless efforts to find covert sources on UK politics online because it wants to be provocative, to display power and because it can.